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Abstract 
 
This paper reconciles two opposite results in the tax competition literature. On one side 
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J.Pub. Econ 94:768-776, 2010) and Hindriks and Nishimura 
(J. Pub Econ 121:66-68, 2015) have shown that the two Stackelberg outcomes prevail as 
the subgame perfect equilibria when capital is entirely owned by non-residents. On the 
other side Ogawa (Int. Tax Pub Fin 20:474-484, 2013) has shown that the simultaneous-
move outcome prevails when capital is entirely owned by residents. We develop a 
model in which capital ownership can vary freely between these two polar cases. We 
show that there exists a unique degree of residential capital ownership such that the 
equilibrium switches from the Stackelberg to the simultaneous-move outcomes. The 
chance for the simultaneous-move outcome to prevail increases with the extent of 
asymmetry among regions. 
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1 Introduction
The issue of leadership in tax competition models has been extensively stud-
ied recently. Using Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) framework, Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010, hereafter K-RG) concluded that the Stackelberg out-
comes are the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) of the timing game. They
also showed that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant outcome.
Hindriks and Nishimura (2015, hereafter HN) adopted di®erent source of re-
gional heterogeneity, namely the intercepts of the capital demand functions
rather than their slopes, to capture the di®erences of the market power. HN
(2015) showed that, contrary to K-RG (2010), leadership by the large region
becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become Pareto superior.
This discussion was based on the assumption that residents did not own the
capital and thus that regions did not internalise the impact of tax choice of
the capital owners (absent ownership model).
However the work of Ogawa (2013) demonstrates the importance of re-
gional capital ownership. Indeed considering the case where the capital is
fully owned by residents in the regions, he showed that the simultaneous-
move outcome prevails as the SPE. Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2014) also
considered that capital is fully owned by residents but not necessarily uni-
formly across regions (i.e., residents in one region may own more capital than
residents in the other region). The unequal distribution of capital ownership
is further developed in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2015) to verify under which
distribution of capital ownership the equilibrium tax leadership still prevails
and the leadership by the small region becomes the risk dominant outcome.
Our contribution in this paper is to provide a simple rejoinder between the
full capital ownership model µa la Ogawa (2013) and K-RG (2014) and the no
capital ownership µa la K-RG (2010) and HN (2015). We will consider that
capital ownership can vary between these two polar cases. The di®erence with
the K-RG (2015) is that we assume uniform capital ownership to restrict at-
tention to a single dimension of asymmetry which is the \market power" in
which the \large" region is characterized by a higher intercept of its demand
for capital. In doing so we provide a unifying framework in which capital
is partially owned by the residents and partially by the non-residents. We
show that: (i) for low levels of regional capital ownership, the two Stackelberg
outcomes prevail as in K-RG (2010, 2014) and the large region leadership is
the risk dominant outcome as in HN (2015), (ii) for intermediate levels of
regional capital ownership, only the large region's leadership prevails as the
unique SPE, and (iii) for high levels of regional capital ownership, only the
simultaneous-move outcome prevails as in Ogawa (2013). Therefore, com-
bining cases (i) and (ii), we can extend the HN (2015)'s result of the large
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region's leadership to partial regional capital ownership. In terms of size ef-
fect, we show that the chance of the simultaneous-move equilibrium to prevail
increases with the extent of asymmetry among regions.
2 The model and the result
There are two regions, denoted by A (large region) and B (small region).1
For any amount of capital employed in region i, Ki, the production in region
i is given by the function Fi(Ki) = (ai ¡ bKi)Ki with aA > aB. Region A
is denoted the \large" region in the sense of facing a higher intercept of its
demand of capital. This can be related to a larger market power. HN (2015)
and Ogawa (2013) use the same form of production asymmetry whereas in
K-RG (2010) the production asymmetry takes the form of di®erent bi but
same a. The total supply of capital ¹K is ¯xed, and the capital is perfectly
mobile between regions. To insure interior solution, we assume:
Assumption 1 ± ´ aA ¡ aB
b ¹K
2 (0; 4).
Region i sets taxes on capital denoted by ti. The arbitrage and the market
clearing conditions involve:
F 0A(KA)¡ tA = F 0B(KB)¡ tB = r; KA +KB = ¹K;
which yield:
Ki(ti; tj) =
1
4
ai ¡ aj + tj ¡ ti + 2b ¹K
b
(i; j = A;B; j 6= i); r = aA + aB ¡ tA ¡ tB ¡ 2b
¹K
2
;
where r is the price of capital which is decreasing in ti.
Capital is freely distributed between regions depending on the tax rates
and the productivity di®erences. However capital ownership is ¯xed. Di®erent
con¯gurations of capital ownership are possible (µA; µB). To limit attention
on the production asymmetry, we assume uniform ownership con¯guration
so that the fraction of capital owned by residents in each region is µA =
µB = µ with µ 2 [0; 1=2]: In that sense, the meaning of \large" region is
unambiguously related to market power and not to capital ownership.2 When
1The model used follows K-RG (2010, 2014), Ogawa (2013), and HN (2015). The
notations closely follow K-RG (2014) and HN (2015).
2K-RG (2015) allowed for a combination of production asymmetry (market power) and
ownership asymmetry (¯nancial power). The results they obtain are much less clear cut
because of the interplay of the two forms of regional asymmetries. We see their analysis
as useful extension of our analysis to account for the presence of small regions with high
¯nancial power.
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µ = 0, the capital is fully owned by absentee owners (K-RG (2010) and HN
(2015)). When µ = 1=2, the capital is fully owned by residents in the regions
(Ogawa (2013) and K-RG (2014)).3
The welfare function of region i is the following:
Wi = Fi(Ki)¡KiF 0i (Ki) + rµ ¹K + tiKi
= Fi(Ki)¡ r(Ki ¡ µ ¹K)
The second equality uses the arbitrage condition F 0i (Ki) = ti + r: Namely,
the welfare function is the total output minus the remuneration of capital on
the amount of capital that is imported. A country that is a tax exporter will
bene¯t from increasing interest rate and a country that is a capital importer
will bene¯t from lower interest rate. Since the interest rate r decreases with
tax, the preferred tax rate is higher for the capital importing country (which
is more likely for low µ). As we will see shortly, negative taxes can prevail in
equilibrium but only in the \small" region and if the capital ownership µ is
su±ciently high.
To derive the equilibrium of the Hamilton-Slutsky's (1990) timing game,
we ¯rst derive the equilibria of three tax games: (i) Simultaneous game
GN where each region chooses ti simultaneously and non-cooperatively, (ii)
Stackelberg Game GA where large region A leads in the choice of the tax
rates, and (iii) Stackelberg Game GB where small region B leads.
Let ­ ´ aA + aB. For GN ,
tNA = b ¹K
µ
1
4
± + 1¡ 2µ
¶
; tNB = b ¹K
µ
¡1
4
± + 1¡ 2µ
¶
;
WNA =
1
2
¹Kµ­ +
±b ¹K2
64
(3± + 24¡ 16µ) + b
¹K2
4
(8µ2 ¡ 12µ + 3);
WNB =
1
2
¹Kµ­ +
±b ¹K2
64
(3± ¡ 24 + 16µ) + b
¹K2
4
(8µ2 ¡ 12µ + 3): (1)
For GA (large region's leadership),
tLA = b ¹K
µ
2
5
± +
8
5
(1¡ 2µ)
¶
; tFB = b ¹K
µ
¡1
5
± +
6
5
(1¡ 2µ)
¶
;
WLA =
1
2
¹Kµ­ +
±b ¹K2
20
(± + 8¡ 6µ) + b
¹K2
20
(44µ2 ¡ 64µ + 16);
W FB =
1
2
¹Kµ­ +
±b ¹K2
100
(3± ¡ 36 + 22µ) + b
¹K2
25
(83µ2 ¡ 108µ + 27): (2)
3Note that the total supply of capital is ¹K so when µ = 1=2 residents in both regions
own together the total stock of capital.
4
For GB (small region's leadership),
tFA = b ¹K
µ
1
5
± +
6
5
(1¡ 2µ)
¶
; tLB = b ¹K
µ
¡2
5
± +
8
5
(1¡ 2µ)
¶
;
W FA =
1
2
¹Kµ­ +
±b ¹K2
100
(3± + 36¡ 22µ) + b
¹K2
25
(83µ2 ¡ 108µ + 27);
WLB =
1
2
¹Kµ­ +
±b ¹K2
20
(± ¡ 8 + 6µ) + b
¹K2
20
(44µ2 ¡ 64µ + 16): (3)
The timing game includes a pre-play stage where the regions decide
whether to move Early or Late. If both regions choose to move Early or
Late, the induced tax competition is GN . If one region i chooses Early and
the other region j chooses Late, the tax competition is a sequential game
Gi (i = A or B), and ends up with the Stackelberg-equilibrium welfare levels
(WLi ;W
F
j ).
It is easy to check that WLi ¡WNi > 0 (i = A; B): if the other region
chooses Late, then the Stackelberg leader, being able to choose (tNA ; t
N
B ) along
the follower's reaction function, is better o® by choosing Early.4 So the
following two conditions are crucial for the determination of the equilibrium
timing (see Appendix A):
Lemma 1 (second-mover incentives):
W FA ? WNA () µ 7
1
2
¡ ±
8
´ µa: W FB ? WNB () µ 7
1
2
¡ 9±
88
´ µb: Since
9
88
<
1
8
, so µa < µb.
The equilibrium timing is characterized as follows. First, for µ 2 [0; µa],
both regions have the second-mover incentive. Here, (Early, Late) and (Late,
Early) are the equilibrium timing: this is an extension of HN (2015) to µ > 0.
Second, for µ 2 (µa; µb), the large region does not have the second-mover
incentive, so playing Early becomes the strictly dominant strategy for region
A. Region B maintains the second-mover incentive, so that (Early, Late) is
the only equilibrium. Third, for µ > µb, playing Early is the strictly dominant
strategy for both regions, so (Early, Early) is the equilibrium timing: this is
an extension of Ogawa (2013) to µ < 1=2.
We next discuss the equilibrium selection for µ 2 [0; µa]. We use Harsanyi
and Selten's (1988) risk-dominance criterion. The equilibrium (Early, Late)
risk-dominates (Late, Early) if and only if:
¦ ´ (WLA ¡WNA )(W FB ¡WNB )¡ (W FA ¡WNA )(WLB ¡WNB ) > 0: (4)
4The Stackelberg leader is strictly better o® than the simultaneous move: WLA ¡WNA =
b ¹K2(± + 4¡ 8µ)2=320 > 0, WLB ¡WNB = b ¹K2(¡± + 4¡ 8µ)2=320 > 0.
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From the values presented above, the derivations product is:
¦ = ¡ 3
4000
b2 ¹K4±(1¡ 2µ)(± + 2
p
6(1¡ 2µ))(± ¡ 2
p
6(1¡ 2µ));
so that ¦ ? 0 () µ 7 1
2
¡ ±
p
6
24
. As
p
6=24 < 1=8, so ¦ > 0 for
all µ 2 [0; µa]. Moreover, (Early, Late) Pareto dominates (Late, Early), if
µ > max
(
0;
1
2
¡
p
15 + 1
28
±
)
´ µc (see Appendix B). This is an extension of
HN (2015, Proposition 1 (ii)).5
Proposition 1 (the ownership e®ect) Under asymmetry in market power
(± > 0) and symmetry in capital ownership (µ 2 [0; 1=2]) there exist 0 ·
µc < µa < µb < 1=2 such that :
(i) For µ 2 [0; µa], the SPEs are (Early, Late) and (Late, Early). Moving
sequentially instead of simultaneously is Pareto-superior. The leadership by
the large region risk-dominates. For µ 2 (µc; µa], the leadership by the large
region is Pareto-superior.
(ii) For µ 2 (µa; µb), the unique SPE is (Early, Late). Only the leader-
ship by the large region, which is Pareto-superior to the simultaneous move,
prevails.
(iii) For µ 2 (µb; 1=2], the simultaneous-move is the unique SPE outcome.6
In short, the leadership by the large region is risk-dominant when µ is
small, and the simultaneous move outcome prevails when µ is large. For
µ 2 [0; µa), most capital owners are non residents, both regions are tax im-
porters (Ki > µ ¹K), so they seek to tax as much income as possible from
capital owners. Evaluated at the equilibrium tax rates, @Wi(t
N
i ; t
N
j )=@tj >
0 (i = A;B; j 6= i): there is a positive spillover. There are two Stackel-
berg outcomes but the leadership by the large region is risk dominant and
it becomes even Pareto dominant for µc < µ · µa . When µ > µa, the
small region su®ers from negative spillover (@WB(t
N
A ; t
N
B )=@tA < 0) so region
B, when it leads, drives the equilibrium taxes below the Nash equilibrium
((tFA; t
L
B) < (t
N
A ; t
N
B )) in order to increase the price of capital. As a result,
region A, the capital importer, preferred the Nash Game GN to GB: Thus
leadership by the small region cannot prevail as the equilibrium outcome.
The next proposition follows directly.
5Pareto domination in the case of µ = 0 is covered in HN (2015). Indeed for ± >p
15¡ 1 ¼ 2:872983, µc = 0.
6We disregard µ = µb is the borderline case in which (Early, Late) and (Early, Early)
are the equilibria.
6
Proposition 2 (the size e®ect) Reducing the asymmetry in size reduces the
chance that the simultaneous-outcome prevails. In the limit, under symmetry
in size (± = 0) and symmetry in capital ownership (µ 2 [0; 1=2)),7 we have
that µa = µb = 1=2. Therefore, the SPEs are (Early, Late) and (Late, Early)
for all µ 2 [0; 1=2). Moving sequentially instead of simultaneously is Pareto-
superior.
Less asymmetry makes the Nash outcome less likely. When asymmetry
decreases, under partial ownership, the small region is also a capital importer
(KNB > µ
¹K) and so it wishes to increase tax to lower the price of capital. The
Stackelberg outcome is preferable. However for su±ciently high asymmetry,
the small region becomes a capital exporter (KNB < µ
¹K) and so it wishes to
tax less by contrast to the large region which is a capital importer (KNA >
µ ¹K). Then the simultaneous outcome is preferable.
3 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that there exists a critical level of capital ownership
such that the endogenous timing of tax competition switches from a Stackel-
berg outcomes to a Nash outcome. This critical level of capital ownership is
strictly less than the full ownership of capital by residents when the regions
di®ers in size. The paper also shows that when the Stackelberg outcome pre-
vails it always involves leadership by the large region. This is an extension of
Hindriks and Nishimura (2015) to the presence of partial ownership of capital
by the residents. When the regions are symmetric, the Stackelberg outcome
always prevails, regardless of ownership of capital by the residents. The re-
sult reconciles some opposite results in the literature under the assumption
of uniform capital ownership between regions.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
W FA ¡WNA = ¡3b ¹K2(8µ¡4+ ±)(9±¡88µ+44)=1600, with 9±¡88µ+44 > 0.
So W FA ? WNA () µ 7
1
2
¡ ±
8
´ µa: Also, W FB ¡WNB = ¡3b ¹K2(¡8µ + 4 +
±)(9± + 88µ ¡ 44)=1600, with ¡8µ + 4 + ± > 0. Therefore, W FB ? WNB ()
µ 7 1
2
¡ 9±
88
´ µb: Q.E.D.
7± = 0 and µ = 1=2 would make tNi = t
L
i = t
F
i = 0 (i = A;B). So here we consider
µ < 1=2.
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Appendix B: Pareto dominance
WLA ¡ W FA = b ¹K2(± + (
p
15 + 1)(1 ¡ 2µ))(± ¡ (p15 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ 2µ))=50, so
that WLA > W
F
A () µ > max
(
0;
1
2
¡
p
15 + 1
28
±
)
´ µc. W FB ¡WLB =
¡b ¹K2(± + (p15 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ 2µ))(± ¡ (p15 + 1)(1 ¡ 2µ))=50, so that W FB >
WLB () µ <
1
2
¡
p
15¡ 1
28
±.
p
15 + 1
28
>
1
8
so µc < µa, and
p
15¡ 1
28
<
1
8
.
Therefore, WLA > W
F
A and W
F
B > W
L
B for all µ 2 (µc; µa].
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